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If, however, a search reveals that his title is not traceable back to a
patent, he must assert his claim m equity on a theory of unjust en-
richment. In either event, he is entitled to a lien which he may en-
force against the land.
ROBERT F STEPHENS
THE VALIDITY OF THE GIFT OVER IN KENTUCKY
DETERMINED THROUGH CONSTRUCTION OF ESTATE
IN FIRST TAKER
When one devises or bequeaths property absolutely, but purports
to provide m the same instrument for a gift over of so much of the
property as remains undisposed of by the first taker at death, the gift
over is invalid and of no effect. The theory underlying this well
established, long standing rule of property law is that a fee simple
has been given to the first taker, leaving nothing which can be the
subject of a gift over or remainder.' This view of the invalidity of
the gift over is consistent with fundamental concepts of property law,
but it is not always clear that the real intent of the testator is given
effect through this construction. An instrument containing his kind
of gift over provision often presents the courts with a difficult con-
struction problem because the specific terms of the will may vary
considerably from case to case, depending on the definiteness with
which the estate of the first taker is described.
In comparatively recent years, a series of interesting cases has re-
opened the question of the validity of this type of gift over provision
in Kentucky and other states.2 Although the rule of property law
would seem to be unchanged, it is being applied with a new rule of
construction which places much more value on the intent of the
testator as drawn from the whole of the instrument. To this extent
at least, it seems particularly evident that the Kentucky Court has
broken away from the consequences of the old rule and will construe
the gift over valid when it finds that such is the intent of the maker
as drawn from the entire instrument.
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the effect of these cases
against the background of earlier Kentucky decisions and to point
'2 Snms, LAW ON FuT--uRE INTERESTS, at 510 et. seq. (1936).
Stewart v. Moms, 313 Ky. 424 (S.W 2d 1950), 231 S.W 2d, 70; Jacobs
v. Barnard, 307 Ky. 321, 210 S.W 2d 972 (1948); Hanks v. McDannell, 307 Ky.
243, 210 S.W 2d 784 (1948).
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out some of the construction problems inherent in the use of certain
traditional phraseology so that the Kentucky draftsman and testator
may guard against invalid dispositions.
It is clear that in order for the gift over to be valid, the estate of
the first taker must be reduced to something less than a fee simple
in order that there may be a remaining interest to vest in the reci-
pient of the gift over. In fact, the whole problem may be said to lie
in determining the estate of the first taker, which in effect means that
seemingly inconsistent clauses in the will must be reconciled. As a
matter of construction, the critical question is whether to determine
the testator s intent from a single clause or from the whole instrument.
Kentucky decisions3 before the 1938 case of Hanks v McDannell4 con-
sistently held that phrases employed to give the first taker power over
the property which would tend to vest in him more than the ordinary
powers consistent with a life estate, created in the first taker a fee
simple, leaving the gift over invalid. The typical wills provision was
in effect as follows: A devises to B his whole estate specifying that
he should have, hold, and enjoy the estate and do with it whatever
he might wish, but later in the will A states that any part of the estate
remaining at the time of B's death goes to C.5 It appearing evident
from the will that the first taker had power to sell or convey part of
all of the estate, the court held that the subsequent clauses devising a
residue of the property failed to take effect.6 Even in early decisions,
the court stated that if a life estate only were devised, with unlimited
powers of disposition, the gift over, clause would be valid.7 A 1940
case held that a will giving the wife, as first taker, power to mortgage
the property as necessary for the support of herself and her children,
plus a codicil giving her power to sell the property as necessary, did
not give her such unlimited powers over the property as to create a
fee simple, but rather gave her only a life estate and the gift over
clause was good because only a life estate was devised to the first
taker.8
In 1948, the court decided the case of Hanks v McDannell,9 where
the will to be interpreted was that of J. H. McDannell, and read in
part:
Pirtle v. Kirk-patnek, 297 Ky. 785, 181 S.W 2d 425 (1944); Wells v. Jennell,
232 Ky. 92, 22 S.W 2d 414 (1929); Jackson v. Ku Klux Klan, 231 Ky. 370, 21
S.W 2d 477 (1929).
'807 y. 243, 210 S.W 2d 784 (1948).
'Jackson v. Ku Klux Klan, 281 Ky. 370, 21 S.W 2d 477 (1929).
'Pirtle v. Kirkpatrick, 297 Ky. 785, 181 S.W 2d 425 (1944).
1Plaggen Borg v. Molendyk s Adm r., 187 Ky. 509, 219 S.W 488 (1920).
'fHarlow v. Riley s Exr, 282 Ky. 437, 138 S.W 2d 946 (1940).
Supra note 4 at 245, 210 S.W 2d at 785.
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"After payment of my just debts and funeral expenses, I give and be-
queath to my beloved wife, Sallie A. McDannell, all the residue of
my property, real and personal, to be used, enjoyed and disposed of
by her m any way she may choose with this provision however-
that, should any of said property belonging to my estate remain at
the death of my said wife, the same shall be devised equally among
Mollie Bledsoe, Lousa Hanks, John W McDannell and Flora
Wooley."
Sallie A. McDaniel attempted to devise the remaining part of the
estate to persons other than those who had been devisees under the
gift over clause of her husband's will. The action was brought by
the latter group against the devisees of Sallie A. McDannell. The
court held that the gift over clause was valid and that the remaining
portion of the property would vest in the devisees under his will. The
court stated that it deemed the foremost consideration should be the
intent of the maker as drawn from the whole instrument and it would
seem that the very insertion of the gift over clause purports that the
intention of the testator was that the clause should have effect. Al-
though the court did not expressly define the estate which was devised
to the first taker, it was spoken of in terms of a life estate in the first
taker and a valid gift over with power of disposition. Further the
court did not really attempt to reconcile its construction of the creation
of a life estate in the first taker and a valid gift over with those which
had formerly been construed as devising a fee simple without possible
remainder. It is clear, therefore, that they made no fundamental
change in the rule of the gift over, but rather a change m the rule of
construction to be applied. Realistic analysis requires, however, the
observation that a change in the application of any rule of law in
effect amounts to a fundamental change in the rule, even though this
"change" is effected through a new rule of construction.
It is reasonable to assume that certain limitations must be placed
upon the estate of the first taker under the will as construed by the
court so that the distinction between the life estate created under the
new rule of construction as represented in the Hanks case and the fee
simple given under the former decisions may be more than an arbi-
trary one. Admittedly the court in the Hanks case was not faced with
the problem of conveyance of the property by the wife during her
lifetime. Had the problem been presented, the logical conclusion
to be drawn from the opinion is that the conveyance would have been
upheld since it was stated in that opinion that the life estate carried
with it power of disposition. The one limitation which this decision
did unequivocally enforce through the terms of the will is that the
first taker must not be given power to dispose of the property by will,
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and that any devise made by the first taker is invalid and gives way
to the gift over clause of the original will.
Again in 1948, the problem was presented to the court0 in a
situation very similar to that of the Hanks case. The testator had
devised his estate to his wife "to have and to hold and to use as she
thinks best" and in a subsequent clause devised any part remaining
at her death to his brothers and sisters and their heirs, share and
share alike. After the wife s death, the devisees under the gift over
clause sold the property at auction. The purchaser filed exception
to the report of sale raising the question as to whether or not the wife
had taken a fee simple under her husband's will. Again the court
held the gift over good. This decision affirmed a decision by a lower
court which had stated that the wife perhaps had power to encroach
upon the corpus of the estate if it were necessary for her support and
maintenance. This brings into question the powers of disposition
which the Hanks case seemingly recognized in the first taker. But in
the opinion of the latter case, the court stated that it was applying
the rules of the Hanks case which should be referred to for the reason-
ing employed to reach the conclusion. From this statement, the
writer concludes that this case did not qualify the decision of the
Hanks case by the affirmation of the lower court decision, and had the
problem of conveyance by the wife during her lifetime been faced,
the court would have held the conveyance good regardless of circum-
stances as so limited by the lower court's decision.
The issue of whether a conveyance by the first taker is valid was
squarely faced in the 1949 case of Wiglesworth v Smith." Harve
Baird's will provided:
"2. All the rest and residue of my estate of whatever the same may
consist whether real or personal or mixed property, I will, devise and
bequeath to my wife Mary Catherine Baird, her life time with the
right to use any or all of the same if in her opimon it may be neces-
sary for her support and maintenance. (Italics are writers)
".3. If at the death of my wife she has not used and expended all of
my estate, I will and devise and bequeath any remainder to H. C.
(Doe) WViglesworth and his wife, Lola NViglesworth, in fee. It is to
be understood that this item is to be no restraint on my wife s use of
my property but just in the event any remains at her death I make
this provision because of the kindness and care they have shown
toward my wife and myself."'
The court held that the wife could use the estate and convey it as pro-
vided in the will, but that she could not give it away or devise it.
" Jackobs v. Barnard, 307 Ky. 321, 210 S.W 2d 972 (1948).
1 Wigleswvorth v. Smith, 311 Ky. 366, 224 S.W 2d 177 (1949).Id. at 367, S.W 2d at 177.
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She could sell the property as she deemed necessary even without
first going through court procedure to have the sale adjudged neces-
sary for her support. This will did limit the wife s estate somewhat
by the necessity clause. But the court placed the weight of interpre-
tation on the wife s opinion of necessity for the sale and therefore
gave her power to use her estate through her own discretion, provid-
ing that she did not give it away or devise it.
It is not to be concluded from these recent decisions that the law
of Kentucky pertaining to the gift over proposition is settled. But
from these decisions, the Kentucky draftsman and testator may be
guided m drafting a will which will devise to the first taker an estate
with somewhat unlimited powers, and yet vest a gift over. From the
Hanks and Jackson cases the conclusion may be drawn that the gift
over clause will be construed as valid so long as the first taker is not
given power to devise, that an attempt by the first taker to do so will
be invalid, and that the first taker will be given power of disposition.
To this conclusion, the Wiglesworth case adds the proposition
that the amount of power of disposition given to the first taker will
be drawn from the phraseology of the will, giving the testator power
to limit or expand the estate as he may wish so long as he does not
attempt to give to the first taker the power to devise the estate or any
part thereof or to otherwise empower him to dispose of the property
at death.
It is submitted that a valid gift over may be sustained through the
following provision: I, A, will, devise, and bequeath to B, the whole
(or a specified part) of my estate, both real and personal, to be used
in any way which he deems desirable or necessary, to be sold or con-
veyed during his lifetime m any way and at any time he may desire.
I further provide that if any of my estate remains at the time of B's
death, after use by B consistent with the foregoing provision, that part
shall go to C in fee simple.
NO1ImA D. BosTm

FRANK MURRAY
